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Hansen: Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

CASE SUMMARY
AN EMPLOYER'S USE OF FEDERAL

SAFETY STANDARDS TO EXCLUDE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES

BATES v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
INC.
INTRODUCTION

In Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., I the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff challenging a
categorical safety-based "qualification standard" under the Americans
with Disabilities Act 2 does not have the burden of establishing that she
could perform the essential function of generally performing the job
"safely.,,3 The plaintiff is instead merely required to show that she is
"qualified" in the sense that she has satisfied all prerequisites for the
position, including any safety-related prerequisites not connected with
the challenged criterion. 4 The burden will then shift to the defendant to
establish that the challenged qualification standard was job-related and
consistent with business necessity. 5 This was an issue of first impression
in the Ninth Circuit, though the resolution was forecast by Morton v.
United Parcel Service, Inc.,6 a case with "strikingly similar" facts. 7
I Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 465 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
242 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2007).
3 Bates, 465 F.3d at 1085.
4 1d.
5 1d.
6 Morton v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 272 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2001).
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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc. concerned whether the United
Parcel Service ("UPS") could, consistent with the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and California Law,s categorically exclude
individuals from employment positions as "package-car drivers" because
they could not pass a United States Department of Transportation
("DOT") physica1. 9 Although UPS required drivers of all package-cars
to pass the DOT physical, to the DOT itself only required the physical for
those driving vehicles with a "gross vehicle weight" and "gross vehicle
weight rating" ("GVWR") of at least 10,001 pounds. 11 A class of UPS
employees and applicants unable to pass the hearing standard that is part
of the DOT physical-a class referred to in the opinion as "Bates" (the
name of the original class's lead plaintiff)-challenged UPS's
application of the DOT hearing standard beyond its intended scope.!2
Bates contended that UPS could not, in accordance with the ADA,
lawfully exclude deaf!3 individuals from consideration for positions that

7 Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. C99-2216, 2004, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21062, at *75
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2004). The primary differences between the two cases are that Bates involved a
plaintiff class rather than a single individual plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the Morton case at
the summary judgment stage rather than after the presentation of evidence at a trial, and, finally, in
Morton, "UPS made its argument that deaf drivers cannot drive safely only as part of its 'business
necessity' defense ...." See Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 465 F.3d 1069, 1084-85 (9th Cir.
2006) (emphasis in original).
8 Bates contended that the policy in question violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213,
and two California Laws: (I) the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), California
Government Code §§ 12900-12996; and (2) the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51.
Bates, 465 F.3d at 1073. Because the panel ultimately found that the district court's injunction could
be upheld solely on ADA grounds and because the pertinent FEHA law had changed since the
district court's decision, the panel did not review the FEHA claim. [d. at 1074. The panel reversed
the district court's finding that UPS violated the Unruh Act, as required by a recent Ninth Circuit
decision, Bass v. County of Butte, 458 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). {d. at 1094.
9 Bates, 465 F.3d at 1073. "An individual who wishes to become a UPS package-car driver
must be an employee of UPS in a qualifying position[,] must 'bid' on a package-car driving
position" when one becomes available (the positions are offered to employees on a seniority basis),
and "must demonstrate that she satisfies several requirements." [d. at 1074. ''These requirements
vary somewhat from district to district but generally include": (I) having a "clean driving record";
(2) passing a UPS road test; and (3) passing the physical exam the DOT requires drivers of
commercial vehicles to pass. [d. It was this third requirement that was at issue in Bates. [d.
10 [d.
II See 49 U.S.C.A. § 31132(1)(A) (West 2007) (defining "commercial motor vehicle,"
drivers of which the DOT regulates, to include any vehicle that "has a gross vehicle weight rating or
gross vehicle weight of at least 10,001 pounds, whichever is greater").
12 Bates, 465 F.3d at 1073.
13 In accordance with the district court's order and the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the term
"deaf' is used to refer to individuals who lack sufficient hearing to pass the DOT hearing standard.
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did not require them to drive DOT -regulated vehicles. 14
"The district court found that Bates satisfied his prima facie case
based upon a combination of two factors: first, UPS's blanket exclusion
of deaf individuals, and second the credentials of at least one named
plaintiff, Babaranti Oloyede, ... who [was] 'qualified' by virtue of
having satisfied all prerequisites for the driving position other than those
connected to the DOT standard.,,15 Accordingly, the district court denied
UPS's motion to decertify the class. 16 "The district court next found that
UPS failed to satisfy its burden under the business necessity defense"
and that the company's policy of categorically excluding individuals
from all employment positions as package-car drivers therefore violated
the ADA. 17 Based on these findings of fact and conclusions of law, "the
district court issued an injunction prohibiting UPS from categorically
excluding individuals who fail the DOT [physical] from consideration
for positions driving non-DOT -regulated vehicles.,,18
UPS appealed, contending, inter alia, that: "( 1) Bates did not
establish that any class members are 'qualified'; (2) UPS satisfied its
burden under the business necessity defense of the ADA; ... [and (3)]
the [district] court's injunction was an abuse of discretion.,,19

14 Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 465 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
It was
undisputed that the DOT standard bars deaf individuals, including members of the plaintiff class,
from driving any vehicles weighing 10,001 pounds or more. [d.; see also Albertson's Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,570 (1999). It was equally undisputed that some vehicles in UPS's fleet
have a GVWR of fewer than 10,001 pounds and are therefore not governed by the DOT regulations
for commercial vehicles, but that UPS nonetheless required all of its package-car drivers to pass the
DOT hearing standard. See Bales, 465 F.3d at 1075 ("As of October 2003, UPS's fleet contained
5902 vehicles with a GVWR of less than 10,001 pounds."). The company has never asked an
individual who failed the DOT hearing test about possible accommodations that might allow that
person to perform the job of a UPS package-car driver. See Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No.
C99-2216, 2004, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21062, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,2004).
15 Bales, 465 F.3d at 1075.
16 Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. C99-22 16, 2004, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21062, at *73
n.14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,2004).
17 Bates, 465 F.3d at 1075.
18 [d. See also Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. C99-2216, 2004, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21062, at *128 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21,2004). The district court was careful to note, however, that "[ilf,
after performing an individualized assessment ... UPS determines that any particular deaf driver
cannot do the job safely, then neither this [clourt's order nor the ADA requires UPS to hire that
person as a package-car driver. [d. at *129.
19 Bales, 465 F.3d at 1073. UPS additionally argued that "the plaintiff class should be
decertified" and that "UPS did not violate the FEHA or the Unruh Act." [d.
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NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
UPS's primary contention on appeal was that the district court had

misallocated the evidentiary burden and that "Bates [bore] the burden of
proving that at least one individual in the class was a

'qualified

individual with a disability' in the sense of being able to perform the
'essential function' of driving 'safely. ",20
would require Bates "to establish through

As a practical matter, this

different

criteria,

not

used by

[UPS],,21 that at least one individual in the class was capable of driving
"safely."

UPS's argument was premised on Ninth Circuit case law

holding that plaintiffs bringing suit under the ADA must ordinarily
"establish that they are 'qualified individuals with disabilities",22 and
language in the ADA that suggested that in order to be considered a
qualified individual with a disability, the plaintiff must be able to
demonstrate that

she can

perform the essential
23
employment position she desired.

functions

of the

The panel rejected this argument, concluding that the proposed
distribution of the burden of proof would be "incompatible with the
statutory scheme.,,24 The panel noted that

§ 12112(b)(6) described the

25
type of discrimination at issue in the present case and that it and "its
parallel affirmative defense,,26 apply when an "individual with a
disability," as opposed to a "qualified individual with a disability," is

Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 465 F.3d 1069,1080 (9th Cir. 2006).
Bates, 465 F.3d at 1081 & n.16 (emphasis in original).
22 ld. at 1081 (quoting Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996».
23 UPS relied on 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)'s provision that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability" and 42 U.S.C. § 1211 I (8)'s definition of
"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." Bates, 465 F.3d at 1081 (emphasis in original).
24 [d. at 1081. The panel noted that requiring all ADA plaintiffs to initially establish that
they are "qualified individuals with disabilities" would be incoherent with regard to another
subsection of § 12112(b), § 12112(b)(4), which "prohibits discrimination against a 'qualified
individual' known to associate with an individual with a disability. [This subsection] thus protects
qualified individuals who do not themselves have disabilities and thus could not possibly meet" any
general requirement that they be a "qualified individual with a disability." Bates, 465 F.3d at 1082.
Further, the court reasoned, even assuming arguendo the statute was ambiguous, relevant legislati ve
history supported the panel's conclusion that § 12112(b)(6) was intended to prohibit the use of a
blanket rule excluding people with certain disabilities unless the employer could show that business
necessity required it to do so. [d.
25 "[U]sing qualification standards ... that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with
a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard ... is shown to be jobrelated for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C.A. §
121 12(b)(6) (West 2007).
26 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a) (West 2007); see also Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
465 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006).
20

21
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excluded from consideration for a position under a categorical
qualification standard. 27 Thus, the panel reasoned, a plaintiff challenging
a facially discriminatory qualification standard need not show that she is
otherwise qualified for the position in question in the sense that she can
perform the essential functions of the position "safely.,,28 Instead, a
plaintiff challenging a categorical safety standard need only prove: (1)
that she is an individual with a disability; (2) that the challenged
qualification standard '''screen[s] out or tend[s] to screen out an
individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities''';
and (3) that she meets all other qualifications for the position unrelated to
the challenged standard?9 If a plaintiff is able to do so, the burden then
shifts to the employer to justify the use of the blanket qualification
standard through the business necessity defense. 30
Having found that the district court had correctly allocated the
evidentiary burdens and correctly determined that at least one class
member, Oloyede, met the threshold requirements to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, the panel went on to review the district
court's extensive findings of fact with respect to UPS's business
necessity defense. 31 The business necessity defense required UPS to
"establish one of two propositions: (1) that substantially all deaf drivers
present an unacceptable risk of danger . . . , or (2) that there is no
practical way to determine which deaf drivers present an unacceptable
risk of danger.,,32 The district court had found that UPS failed to meet its
evidentiary burden and the Ninth Circuit panel concurred. 33 The
evidence that UPS presented-that "hearing driver[s] [are] generally
safer than [] deaf driver[s] with similar skills and characteristics"-failed
to address the key question of "whether there were some deaf drivers
who are as safe or safer than some or all of the hearing drivers UPS
employe[d].,,34 Similarly, UPS failed to present evidence tending to
Bates, 465 F.3d at 10SI.
This would, on a practical level, be virtually impossible to prove where, as here, the
employer bars employees from any individualized assessment of their safe driving ability precisely
because they are unable to meet the categorical safety standard. As the panel noted, "the ability to
drive 'safely,' while critically important for a commercial driver, is not a self-defining quality."
Bates, 465 F.3d at IOS1 n.16.
29 Bates, 465 F.3d at lOSS (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6)) (emphasis in original).
30 [d.
27

28

[d. at IOS6-92.
Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 465 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006).
33 [d.
31

32

34 [d. at IOS9 (emphasis in original). As the panel pointed out, this comparison is key. All
employers tolerate some risk of vehicle accidents and evaluate that risk in their own way. [d. at
IOS1 n.16. Thus the concept of risk is an individual, not aggregate one. [d. at 10S9. UPS cannotin accordance with the ADA-decrease its overall risk by excluding one subgroup because of the
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show that there was no practical or effective criteria which could be
employed to separate safe from unsafe deaf drivers. 35 Accordingly, the
panel affirmed the district court's fmding that UPS had failed to carry its
burden to establish the business defense, and the district court's legal
conclusion that UPS's use of the DOT qualification standard in this
context violated the ADA. 36
Finally, the panel rejected UPS's challenge to the terms of the
district court's injunction, finding that the injunction-which prohibited
UPS from categorically excluding deaf drivers from consideration and
instead required some form of individualized assessment-"intruded into
UPS's business practices and discretion 'to the least degree possible
under the ADA.",37

m.

lMPLICAnONS OF THE DECISION

While a court will give complete deference to federal safety
regulations that exclude individuals with disabilities from certain jobs,38
Bates illustrates that when an employer adopts a government certified
safety standard and applies it beyond its intended scope, the employer
will be required to justify the use of the standard to the specific job at
issue under the ADA's "business necessity" defense. 39 The proffered
justification will be subject to heavy court scrutiny. The employer must
be able to demonstrate either that practically every individual who fails
to meet the standard will be unable to perform the essential functions of
the job, or that such an assessment is impossible. 4O It should be
remembered, however, that this framework only applies to whether an
employer may use a particular qualification standard that precludes a
disabled person from obtaining an individualized determination of his or
her suitability for the position. 41 If a court, following Bates, fmds against
an employer, it only follows that the employer may not use the
incremental aggregate additional risk it assertedly poses, without showing any individualized risk
that is beyond the risk for another subgroup that is not excluded. [d.
35 [d. at 1091. The panel noted that UPS uses, inter alia, driving records and extensive
dri ving tests to aid in predicting whether non-deaf individuals will be safe drivers. [d. Accordingly,
the burden fell to UPS to explain why similar criteria could not be used to separate safe from unsafe
deaf drivers. [d. Absent some explanation, "the district court was entitled to conclude that UPS had
not met its burden of demonstrating that there are no practical criteria available" for determining
which deaf drivers are safe. [d.
36 [d. at 1094.
37 [d. at 1093.
38 See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,570 (1999).
39 See Morton v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 272 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2001).
40 Bates v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 465 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cu. 2006).
41/d.
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qualification standard, not that the individual must be hired to the
position. 42

IANHANSEN*

1d.
• J.D. Candidate, 2007, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; B.A.
Philosophy, 2004, Portland State University, Portland, OR. Senior Editor, Golden Gate University
Law Review. Thanks to Suzanne, Atticus and Michael.
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